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Abstract

The International Terrorism by BG Ahmad D. Al Farajat, Jordan Armed Forces, 53 pages.

September 11, 2001, was a day that future historians will call a hinge of history. On that day, a lethal blow was struck in the heart of freedom. From that day on, international terrorism could no longer be considered a tactical threat with no real global implications.

There is no question that terrorist incidents will continue to plague the international community well into the foreseeable future. One primary reason for this is the inherent difficulty involved in preventing a terrorist attack before it occurs. Another is the often fanatical nature of individuals who carry out the often suicidal assaults. These factors are often the primary reason that the only action that can be taken in response to terrorism is after-the-fact. Herein, too, lies a significant and controversial problem; which responses are appropriate?

The purpose of this monograph is to examine the origin structure and goals of the international terrorism and terrorist action and identify steps the U.S. can take to stop the threat of terrorism coming from the Middle East. The focus of this monograph is, therefore, on the U.S. available policy options which range to combat international terrorism from diplomacy, international cooperation, intelligence capabilities, economic sanctions to the use of the military forces, against Middle East States on the terrorist list (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Sudan).

The author concludes that the war against terrorism can be won, not merely contained. But, this will require war aims focused on terrorists "ideology" not their tactics. He adds that the war on terrorism will undoubtedly fail if it is perceived as a war on Islam and generates a call for *Jihad* especially if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not resolved. Finally, the U.S. cannot defeat global terrorism without support from its allies and friends especially Europe and Islamic States, just as was the case in the Gulf War.

It is still impossible to tell, of course, exactly how this war will end. It is possible, even now though, to give some recommendations that will lead to the best possible conclusion to the war. If American leaders continue to concentrate on winning the war, not just winning the first battle, the result will be a world free of terrorism.

The International Terrorism

A Monograph

By

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THE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism has become part of our daily news. Hardly a day goes by without news of an assassination, political kidnapping, hijacking or bombing somewhere in the world. The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 and its tragic consequences, once again focused the worlds attention on the problem of modern terrorism. Unlike their historical counterparts, present day terrorists have introduced into contemporary life a new breed of violence in terms of technology. Victimization of modern violence makes it abundantly clear that we have entered a unique "Age of terrorism" with all its frightening ramifications. Experts agreed that there is almost always a strategy behind terrorist actions. Whether it takes the form of bombings, hijackings or assassinations, terrorism is not random, spontaneous, nor blind. It is a deliberate use of violence against civilians for political or religious ends.

Terrorism is the use of violence and threats to intimidate or coerce, especially for political purpose (chapter 1 provides additional definitions of terrorism). If a "war is a continuation of policy, by other means", then is terrorism a form of the "other means" to achieve the policy?¹ Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian military theorist who observed the Napoleonic Wars, developed this theory of war referring to the conventional war between nation states. The "means" in his conventional sense, was combat between armies. Webster defines combat as "to

¹Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Peret (N.J. Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.

fight” active fighting between enemy forces, “or any struggle or controversy”.² Therefore, could terrorism be a “means” of combat? Although Clausewitz was not referring to terrorism in his writings, one could argue that the definition of terrorism fits his theoretical definition of war. Obviously wars waged by both sides to the full extent of their national strength, must be conducted on different principles from wars, in which policy was based on the comparative size of the regular armies. The people became a participant in war; instead of governments and armies, as heretofore, because war became the business of the people whom considered themselves to be citizens, as Clausewitz mentioned in his book “*On War*.”

A modern trend in terrorism is toward loosely organized, self-financed, international networks of terrorists. Another trend is toward terrorism that is religiously – or ideologically motivated. Radical Islamic Fundamentalist groups, or groups using religion as a pretext, pose terrorist threats of varying kinds to international security and stability and to U.S. interests. A third trend is the apparent growth of cross-national links among different terrorist organization, which may involve combinations of military training, funding, technology transfer or political advice.

Looming over the entire issue of international terrorism is a trend toward proliferation of weapon of mass destruction (WMD). For instance Iran, seen as the most active state sponsor of terrorism, has been aggressively seeking a nuclear arms capability.³ Iraq is thought to be stockpiling chemical and biological agents.⁴ Also, indications have surfaced that the Al-Qaeda organization attempted to acquire chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.⁵ As a result, stakes

² Brahm Carol G. Editor, *Random House Webster's Dictionary* (New York Ballanting Books 1996), 681.

³ Congressional Research Service, CRS Issue Brief IB95112, *Terrorism, the Future and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (updated July 10, 2002).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

in the war against international terrorism and its supporters are increasing and margins for error in selecting appropriate policy instruments or combination of them to prevent terrorist attacks are diminishing correspondingly.

Terrorists increasingly have been able to develop their own sources of financing, which range from Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and charities to illegal enterprises such as narcotics, extortion and kidnapping. Colombia Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is said to make hundreds of millions annually from criminal activities. Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda depends on a formidable array of fundraising operations including charities, legitimate businesses and money transfer network.⁶

Furthermore, indications have surfaced of cross-national links among different terrorist organization, for example. Chechen rebel were trained in Al-Qaeda terrorist camps in Afghanistan and even in Chechnya itself. Al-Qaeda funding reputedly helped establish the Islamic separatist group Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines. Some mid and low-level cooperation between Al-Qaeda and the Lebanese Hizballah in such areas as weapons smuggling and training for terrorist operations.⁷

In a similar vein to conventional warfare, Muslim radical have used "*Jihad*" to justify their terrorist strategies and tactics. As such, they have tended to blur the distinction between combatant and non-combatant and have employed extraordinary methods in pursuit of their goals. Suicide bombing has one such method. To the vast majority of Muslims, Islamic terrorism is a contradiction in term. Muslim tradition clearly condemns killing of innocent civilians, even in warfare. For example, "the Prophet Mohammad always warned against the

⁶Ibid, 6.

⁷Ibid.

killing of women and children". Attacking civilian targets is wrong because innocent people lose their lives. Yet, despite this religious admonition, Islamic history contains myriad examples where Muslims extremists and radicals have used Islam to justify terrorist acts. Muslim clerics need to address radical Islam as a heresy when used to justify indiscriminate killing in the name of Islam with promises of martyrdom for those who commit suicide. Christianity and Judaism have faced similar challenges as Christians and Jews have killed women and children in the name of God.⁸ The Quran and the *Sunneh*, or Prophetic example provide a theology for peace, for living a world of diverse nations and people.⁹ They also provide guideline on how to fight the enemy as well as how to fight against corruption and oppression.¹⁰ Chapter Two will focus on Middle Eastern terrorism countries and radical Islamic groups and analyze the holy war (*Jihad*).¹¹

In his *National Security Strategy* on September 20, 2002, President Bush clarify his strategy which will soon be transmitted to congress as a declaration of the Administration policy "The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflect the union of our values and our national interest. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom peaceful relations with other state, and respect for human dignity."¹²

Most experts agree that the most effective way to fight terrorism is to gather as much intelligence as possible, disrupt terrorist plans and organization before they act and organize

⁸George W. Gawrych, *Jihad, War and Terrorism*, available from www.cgsc.army.mil/csi/research/JihadGawrych.doc accessed 2 August 2001.14.

⁹The concept of *Sunnah* "normative practice exemplary behavior of Prophet Muhammad", Esposito, 172.

¹⁰John L. Esposito, *Unholy War*, (New York, Oxford University Press 2002), 29.

¹¹The concept of "*Jihad*" is "strive, effort, struggle" to follow Islam; can include defense of faith, armed struggle, holy war. Esposito, 170.

¹²Full Text: *Bush's National Security Strategy*, United States, Washington, D.C. 20 September 2002, available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/20/politics/20STEXT_Full.html.

multinational cooperation against terrorist and countries that support them. The UN's role in mandating sanctions against Libya for its responsibility in the 1988 Pan Am 103 bombing was significant as the first instance when the world community imposed sanctions against a country in response to its complicity in an act of terrorism. In his address to a joint session of congress and the American people on September 20, 2001, President Bush mentioned how can we defeat terrorism when he said : "But the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows."¹³ Chapter Three focuses on combating terrorism, discusses President Bush's speech to Congress in September 2001, and analyzes the use of military actions, economic sanctions, diplomacy and building International Coalitions in support of Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

This monograph examines International terrorism and terrorist actions and the U.S policy response. Available policy options range from diplomacy, international cooperation and constructive engagement to economic sanctions, covert action, physical security enhancement, to the use of military forces.

The conclusion will identify steps the U.S. can take to effectively stop the threat of terrorism coming from the Middle East, while addressing the fact that this war can be won, not merely contained. But this will require war aims focused on enemies "ideology" not their tactics and this in turn will demand an especially close interconnection between a war of military violence and inseparable war of ideas. The struggle against terrorism is never ending . Our search for solutions and new approaches must be continuous and unyielding, identical to the threat posed by our adversaries in both innovation and determination.

¹³Bush, George W. *Address to Joint Session of Congress and the American people*, 20 September 2001.

CHAPTER ONE

DEFINING TERRORISM

What is terrorism? Few words have so insidiously worked their way into our everyday vocabulary, like “internet” – another grossly over used term that has similarly become an indispensable part of the argot of the late twentieth century. Most people have only a vague idea or impression of what terrorism is. They lack a more precise, concrete and truly explanatory definition of the word. This imprecision has been abetted partly by the modern media, whose efforts to communicate an often complex and convoluted message in the briefest amount of air time or print space possible have led to the promiscuous labeling of a range of violent acts as “terrorism”.

The word “terrorism” was first popularized during the French Revolution. According to Bruce Hoffman; In contrast to it’s contemporary usage, The system or regime “*de la terreur*” of 1793 from which the English word came – was adopted as a means to establish order during the transient anarchical period of turmoil and upheaval that followed the uprisings of 1789, as it has followed in the wake of many other revolutions.¹⁴

Dictionary definitions are of little help. The pre-eminent authority on the English language, the much venerated Oxford English Dictionary (OED), is disappointingly un-obliging

¹⁴Bruce Hoffman, *Inside terrorism*, (New York, Columbia University Press 1998), 15.

when it comes to providing edification on this subject, its interpretation at once too literal and too historical to be of much contemporary use:

Terrorism A system of terror: A system of terror. 1. Government by intimidation as directed and carried out by the Party in power in France during the revolution of 1789-94; the system of terror. 2.gen. A policy intended to strike with terror those against whom it is adopted; the employment of methods of intimidation; the fact of terrorizing or condition of being terrorized.¹⁵

These definitions are wholly unsatisfying. Rather than learning what terrorism is, one instead finds, in the first instance a somewhat restricted historical- and, in respect of the modern accepted usage of the term, a uselessly anachronistic description. The second definition offered is only slightly more helpful. While accurately communicating the fear inducing quality of terrorism, the definition is still so broad as to apply to almost any action that scares (terrorizes) us. Though an integral part of "terrorism", this definition is still insufficient for the purpose of accurately defining the phenomenon that is today called "terrorism".

The term "terrorism" has no precise or widely accepted definition. The problem of defining terrorism is compounded by the fact that terrorism has recently become a fad word used promiscuously and often applied to a variety of acts of violence which are not strictly terrorism by definition.¹⁶

There is no universally accepted definition of International terrorism. One definition widely used in U.S. government circles, and incorporated into law, defines "international terrorism" as terrorism involving the citizens or property of more than one country. Terrorism is broadly defined as politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents. "Terrorist group" is defined as a group which

¹⁵Ibid, 14.

¹⁶Yonah Alexander and John M. Gleason. *Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism*. (New York, Pergamon Press, 1981), 3.

practices or which has significant sub-groups that practice terrorism.¹⁷ One potential shortfall of this definition is its focus on groups and group members and exclusion of individual (non-group organized) terrorist activity which has recently risen in frequency and visibility.

Most people can recognize terrorism when they see it. Experts have had difficulty coming up with an ironclad definition. Paul Pillar, a former deputy chief of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) Counter Terrorist Center, argues that there are four key elements of terrorism: First, it is premeditated –planned in advance, rather than an impulsive act of rage. Second, it is political –not criminal, like the violence that groups such as the mafia use to get money, but designed to change the existing political order. Third, it is aimed to civilian – not at military targets or combat –ready troops. And finally, it is carried out by sub – national groups – not by the army of a country.¹⁸

The CIA definition of international terrorism is "Terrorism conducted with the support of foreign government or organization and/or directed against foreign nationals, institutions or governments."¹⁹

Different departments or agencies of even the same government will themselves often have different definition for terrorism. The U.S State Department, for example, uses the definition of terrorism contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656 (d) premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.²⁰ While the U.S Department of Defense (DOD) defines terrorism as: "The unlawful use of – or threatened

¹⁷Gabrielle Perry, *Terrorism Reader*, (Huntington, New York, 2001), 118.

¹⁸ Council of Foreign Relation, *Terrorism, Question and Answer*, available from <http://www.terrorismanswer.com/causes/regimes.html>, accessed 2 August 2002.6

¹⁹Edward S. Herman. *The real terrorism network. Terrorism in fact and propaganda*. (Boston, 1982), 22.

²⁰Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1998), 38.

use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.”²¹

And the US Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) define it as: “The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objective.”²²

Each of the three definitions reflects the priorities and particular interests of the specific agency involved. The State Department’s emphasis is on the pre-meditated and planned or calculated nature of terrorism in contrast to more spontaneous acts of political violence. Its definition is also the only one of the three to emphasize both the ineluctably political nature of terrorism and the perpetrators’ fundamental “sub-national” characteristic. The State Department’s definition, however, is conspicuously deficient in failing to consider the psychological dimension of terrorism.

The FBI definition of terrorism focuses on a different element, unlike the State Department, this definition does address the psychological dimensions of the terrorist act described above, laying stress on terrorism’s intimidating actions and coercive aspects. The FBI definition also identifies a much broader category of terrorist targets than only “non-combatants” specifying not only governments and their citizens, but also inanimate objects, such as private and public property. The FBI definition further recognizes social along side political objectives as fundamental terrorist aim – though it offers no clear elucidation of either.

The DOD definition of terrorism is arguably the most complete of the three. It highlights the terrorist threat as much as the actual act of violence and focuses on terrorism’s targeting of

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

whole societies as well as governments. The DOD definition further cites the religious and ideological aims of terrorism along side its fundamental political objectives – but curiously omits the social dimension found in the FBI's definition.

In his book, *Political Terrorism* (1983), Alex P. Schmid surveyed 100 scholars and experts in the field and asked for a definition of terrorism. This analysis found two characteristics of the definition: first, an individual being terrorized. and second, the terrorist act meaning is derived from its target and victims.²³ Schmid's analysis concluded that the following elements are common throughout the 100 definitions surveyed. Terrorism is an abstract concept with no essence. A single definition cannot account for all the possible uses of the term. Many different definition share common element. And the meaning of terrorism derives from the victim of (sic) target.²⁴

There are various categories of terrorism based on their source or sponsorship. The FBI defines two broad categories of terrorism: domestic and international. Domestic terrorism involves groups or individuals whose terrorist activities are directed at elements of the U.S Government or population without foreign direction.²⁵ An example of domestic terrorism was the Oklahoma City bombing of a federal building, which was perpetrated by and American citizen. International terrorism involves groups or individuals whose terrorist activities are foreign – based and/or directed by countries or groups outside the United States or whose

²³for a detailed discussion for a definition of terrorism, see Alex P. Schmid, *Political Terrorism*. A Research guide. (Amsterdam, 1983), 5-152.

²⁴ Political Terrorism Database, (PTD). *Definition of Terrorism*. Available from: http://polisci.home.mindspring.com/ptd_definition.html. Accessed 18 July 2002, 1.

²⁵ *Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)* available from <http://www.fema.gov/hazards/terrorism/terror.shtm>. Accessed 18 July 2002, 1.

activities transcend national boundaries.²⁶ An example of international terrorism, the September 11th incident in the United States.

Within the definition of international terrorism, it is necessary to highlight two sub-categories: state terrorism and transnational terrorism. State terrorism, as the name implies, is sponsored or supported by a nation. Hizballah (Party of God), a radical Islamic group, closely supported and often directed by Iran, is an example of a state terrorist group. Transnational terrorism is not tied to or has minor ties to any specific nation, unlike state terrorists, transnational terrorists are not controlled by a nation's policy and often operate out of hatred or religious reasons. An example of transnational terrorism is the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center perpetrated by the Ramzi Ahmad Yousef gang.

The concepts of "state terrorism" and an "individual terrorist" act are difficult to define or separate one from the other. It is difficult to define, because to some international and national actors, "terrorism" is a political act, while to others, it is a criminal act. It is also difficult to separate the two because state terrorism and individual terrorism overlap.²⁷

The U.S. is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism....premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.²⁸

With respect to the international community: international organizations historically have been unable to agree on a definition of terrorism, since one man's terrorist is often another man's freedom fighter. Because of this overriding political constraint, countries have taken the approach of creating networks of conventions, which criminalize specific acts such as

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Alex Obote Ordora, *Defining International Terrorism*, available from, <http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v6nl/obete-obete-ordora61-text.html>, accessed 15 August 2002, 4.

²⁸ Full Text: *Bush's National Security Strategy*, September 20, 2002.

kidnapping, detonation bombs or hijacking airplanes. Still, the 1999 international convention for the suppression of the financing of terrorism comes close to a definition, since according to the text it is a crime to collect or provide funds with the intent of killing or injuring civilians where the purpose is to intimidate a population or coerce a government.

CHAPTER TWO

MIDDLE EASTERN TERRORISM COUNTRIES

This group and its leader...a person named Usama bin Laden...are linked to many other organizations in different countries, including the Egyptian Islamic *Jihad* and the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan. There are thousands of those terrorists in more than 60 countries. They are recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan, where they are trained in the tactics of terror. They are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction.²⁹

President George W. Bush

Washington, D.C. (Address to a joint session of congress and American People)
September 20, 2001.

Each year, under the provision of Section 6 (J) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, the Secretary of Commerce in Consultation with the Secretary of State provides Congress with a list of countries that support international terrorism.³⁰

Each determination under Section 6(J) of the act must also be published in the Federal Register. On May 21, 2002 the State Department released its annual report on trends in international terrorism, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001*.³¹

Patterns 2001 still list seven state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Korea and Sudan.³² The report indicated that, of the seven, Libya and Sudan were closest to being taken off the terrorism list. *Patterns* also noted that Iran, North Korea and Syria have "made limited moves to cooperate with the international community's campaign against terrorism." Syria, for instance, cooperated with U.S. investigations of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups and Iran provided certain support to

²⁹ Bush, George W. President of the United States *Address to a joint session of Congress and the American people*, September 20, 2001.

³⁰ The determinations are made in accordance with Section 6(J) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C.2405(J)). See Gabrielle Perry. *Terrorism Reader*. (Huntington, New York, 2001), 25.

³¹ Congressional Research Service (CRS) Issue Brief IB95112. *Terrorism, the future, and U.S. foreign policy*. (updated July 10, 2002).

³² Ibid. Cuba was added to the U.S. list of countries supporting international terrorism because of its support for the M-19 guerilla organization in Columbia. North Korea was added to the "official" list of countries supporting terrorism because of its implication in the bombing of a South Korea airliner on November 29, 1987, in which 115 passengers and crew were killed. See Gabrielle Perry, 12.

to the U.S. led campaign to topple The Taliban in Afghanistan. Yet Iran is still described in *Pattern* as the most active state supporter of terrorism and both Iran and Syria continue to support groups such as Hamas and Hizballah that oppose the Middle East peace process.³³

In general terms, the international terrorism threat to the world and to U.S. interests in particular can be divided into three categories: the radical international *Jihad* movement, traditional, clearly defined terrorist organizations, and state sponsors of international terrorism.³⁴

The most serious international terrorist threat today stems from *Sunni* Islamic extremist, such as Usama bin Laden and individuals affiliated with his Al-Qaeda organization.³⁵ Al-Qaeda leaders, including Usama bin Laden, had been harbored in Afghanistan since 1996 by the extremist Islamic regime of the Taliban. The Al-Qaeda network's willingness and capability to inflict large-scale violence and destruction

against U.S. persons and interests – as it demonstrated with the September 11 attack, the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in October 2000 and the bombing of two U.S. Embassies in East Africa in August 1998.³⁶

The second category of international terrorist threat is made up of the traditional and more clearly defined terrorist organization. They autonomous, generally transnational, groups have their own personnel, infrastructures, financial arrangements and training facilities. They are able to plan and mount terrorist campaigns on an

³³Ibid.

³⁴Congressional statement, FBI, *combating Terrorism: Protecting the United States*. Available from <http://www.fbi.gov/congress02/caruso32102htm.march21,2002,2>.

³⁵The concept of "*Sunni*": Muslims, the majority community, who believe that they represent the authority of the *Sunnah* or example of the Prophet Muhammad and the early Muslim Community. Esposito .172.

³⁶Congressional statement ,FBI.2

international basis, and several actively support terrorist-related activities in the U.S.

Extremist groups include Palestinian Hamas, the Irish republican army, the Egyptian Al-Gama al-Islamiyya (IG) and Lebanese Hizballah.³⁷

State sponsors of terrorism make up the third category of international terrorist threat. The primary state sponsors are Iran, Iraq, Sudan and Libya. These countries view terrorism as a tool of foreign policy. Syria, which is also on the U.S. Department of State's list of state sponsors of terrorism, has not been directly involved in conducting terrorist activity for a number of years but still provides a safe haven to international terrorist groups and loosely affiliated extremists.³⁸ Since the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, and particularly since the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in November of that year, radical Islam has attracted widespread press attention as the driving ideology of the most active Middle Eastern terrorist groups and state sponsors.³⁹

COUNTRIES ON THE LIST

Iran. In a change from *Patterns* 1998, *Patterns* 1999, as well as *Patterns* 2000 names Iran as the most active – and increasingly active – state sponsor of terrorism.⁴⁰ Iran continues to be deeply involved in the planning and execution of terrorism acts by it's own agents and surrogate groups. It provides “increasing support” – ongoing direction, safe haven, funding, training, weapons and other support – to a variety of radical Islamic terrorist groups including Hizballah in Lebanon, as well as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic *Jihad* (PIJ) to undermine the Middle East peace process. According to *Patterns* 2000, Iran provides “funding, training and logistics assistance to extremist

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Gabrielle Perry, 28.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 134.

groups in the Gulf, Africa, Turkey and Central Asia.⁴¹ Iran was placed on the terrorist List in January of 1984. Iran also has been accused by the regional government of sponsoring assassinations of anti-Shiite Muslim clerics in Tajikistan and Pakistan, and of supporting Shiite Muslim Islamic opposition movement in the Persian Gulf State of Iraq.⁴² The threat perceived from Iran as a leading supporter of terrorism is substantially raised by reports that Iran is seeking to acquire nuclear technology and seeking nuclear weapons technology. According to President George W. Bush "Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an un-elected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom."⁴³ The *Ayatollah Khomeini* declared on the occasion of the Iranian New Year in March 1980, just over a year after the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran, "We must strive to export our Revolution throughout the world."⁴⁴

Iraq. On September 13, 1990, Iraq was placed once again on the terrorism list, after having been removed in 1982.⁴⁵ Iraq's ability to instigate terror has been curbed by U.S. and U.N. sanctions which were imposed after the Kuwait invasion. Nevertheless, *Patterns* 2000 indicates that Saddam Hussein's regime continues to murder dissidents and provide a safe haven for a variety of Palestinian rejectionist groups. There are numerous claims that Iraqi intelligence is behind the killing of dissidents on foreign soil during 2000. Iraq organized a failed assassination plot against former President George

⁴¹State Department Publication 10822, released April 2001. See Gabrielle Perry, 134.

⁴²The concept of "*Shii, Shiite*" "Party or Faction" of Ali bin Abi Talib, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad; those Muslims who believe that Muhammad designated Ali and his rightful descendants to be the true leaders of the Muslim Community. Esposito.171.

⁴³Bush, George W. President of the United States, *President Delivers State of the Union Address*, United States Capitol, Washington, D.C. January 29, 2002. (Whitehouse news & speechs.online.) <http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/print/20020129-11.html>.

⁴⁴Bruce Hoffman, 95. *Ayatollah (Ayatullah)* – "Sign of God", title of a high ranking *Shii* religious leader. Esposito,169.

⁴⁵Gabrielle Perry, 135.

H. W. Bush during his April 1993 visit to Kuwait which triggered a U.S. retaliatory missile strike on Iraq intelligence headquarters.⁴⁶ Iraq, which historically has had close ties to Yasir Arafat, has given some support to the anti-peace process Palestinian group, and hosts the Abu Nidal organization, Abu Abbas, Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and other minor groups. In his Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly, President George W. Bush specifically mentioned that Iraqi shelter and support terrorist groups:

In 1991, the U.N. Security Council, through Resolution 687, demand that Iraq renounce all involvement with terrorism, and permit not terrorist organization to operate in Iraq. Iraq's regime agreed. It broke this promise. In violation of Security Council Resolution 1373, Iraq continues to shelter and support terrorist organizations that direct violence against Iran, Israel, and Western government. Iraqi dissidents abroad are targeted for murder. In 1993, Iraq attempted to assassinate the Emir of Kuwait and a former American President. Iraq's government openly praised the attacks of September the 11th. And Al Qaeda terrorists escaped from Afghanistan and are known to be in Iraq.⁴⁷

Libya. The State Department has singled out Libya as the most flagrant sponsor of terrorism and user of terrorism as government policy. In November 1991, the British and U.S. government formally accused Libya of responsibility for the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Locherbie, Scotland, killing all 259 passengers on board and 11 people on the ground.⁴⁸ The United Nation Security Council adopted Resolution 731 on January 21, 1992, calling for Libyan cooperation. After three months of fruitless negotiations, the Council passed another Resolution (748) on March 31, 1992 which mandated sanctions against Libya.⁴⁹

The CIA says that there is evidence that Muammar Qadhafi (Libyan leader) has been providing money, weapons, and training to terrorists operating in many countries and that Libya has been a haven for fleeing terrorists, including some of the slayers of the

⁴⁶ Ibid. 63

⁴⁷ Bush, George W. President of the United States. *President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly*, New York 12 September 2002 (Whitehouse News & Speeches online) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/print/20020912-1.html>.

⁴⁸ Gabrielle Perry, 9.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 10.

Israeli Olympic athletes at Munich in 1972. Press reports have also linked Libya to the Japan's Red Army, Italy's Red Brigade and Muslim insurgents in Indonesia and Philippines.⁵⁰ There is no evidence of Libyan involvement in recent acts of international terrorism. Libyan terrorism has been sharply reduced after imposition of U.N. sanctions in the wake of Libyan involvement in the bombings of Pan Am flight 103. Libya has been "sending signals" that it wants to get out of the terrorism business and has offered to compensate the families of the victims of flight 103.⁵¹

Syria. Syria was placed on the first terrorism list in December 1979. It is generally believed within the Western community that Syria has a long history of using terrorists to advance its own interests.⁵² Syrian intelligence agents and diplomats have been linked to terrorist attacks on Jordanian officials as well as Syrian dissidents living abroad. Abu Nidal, leader of a radical Palestinian terrorist group, has been reported to have been sponsored by Syria before switching to an association with Libya.⁵³

According to *Patterns 2000*, many major terrorist groups are known to maintain an active presence (including training camps and operational headquarters) in Syria or in Syrian controlled Lebanon, and Syria has allowed Iran to supply Hizballah with weapons via Damascus.⁵⁴ Providing such support, free movement and safe haven has caused prominent members of Congress to contend that Syria should remain on the terrorism list.

Patterns 2000 says that Syria allowed Hamas to open a new office in Damascus in March 2000.⁵⁵ The Assad government in Damascus is widely believed to have been behind the assassinations of political leaders in Lebanon and at least implicated in the

⁵⁰ Ibid, 11.

⁵¹ Ibid, 135.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Abu Nidal died in Baghdad in October 2002 under mysterious circumstances.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 135.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 58.

terrorist attacks on Americans there.⁵⁶ Syria continued to allow Iran to re-supply Hizballah through the Damascus airport, and has allowed visiting Iranian officials to meet with anti-peace process terrorist organizations based in Syria.⁵⁷

Sudan. Sudan was added to the terrorist list in August 1993, because of its continued cooperation with Iran in promoting militant attacks in surrounding countries and for allowing Iranian militants to establish guerrilla-training bases inside Sudan.⁵⁸ Terrorists and terrorist groups are allowed free entry into Sudan and many of the hard-line groups have established offices in Khartoum and other parts of the country. As a consequence, Egypt has accused the Sudanese government of exporting violence into Egypt. Egypt and Ethiopia have charged the Sudan government with involvement in a failed assassination attempt against President Hosni Mubark while in Ethiopia in June 1995.⁵⁹ Sudan continues to harbor members of some of the world's most violent organizations and according to *Patterns* 2000 continues to serve as a safe haven for a number of terrorist organizations including PIJ, Hamas, and bin Laden's Al Qaeda organization.⁶⁰ The decision to add Sudan to the list was based upon evidence that the government had been harboring terrorist elements in the country and helping train radical militants to carry out terrorist attacks in other countries. The State Department says it is engaged in discussions with Sudan with the objective of getting Sudan "Completely out of the terrorism business and off the terrorism list."⁶¹

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Syrian strategy towards the peace process has not changed during the administration of Bashar Al-Assad. As the U.S. signaled its willingness to be actively involved in the peace process to bring about a final resolution of the Arab-Israeli problem along the lines of the "Saudi vision" as proposed by Prince Abdullah, Syria publicly stated its concern that the Arab peace initiative was being "Americanized" and set on a path of separate tracks. See Sami G. Hajjar, *Hizballah: Terrorism, National Liberation or Menace?* SSI, U.S. Army War College, August 2002, 18.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 13.

⁵⁹ Ibid, 136.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ *Patterns* 2000, 31.

Radical Islamic Groups.

The end of the first Arab-Israeli War in 1949 introduced two new factors into Middle Eastern politics: the Jewish State of Israel and the Palestinian refugees. During the war, many of Palestine's Arab inhabitants had fled their homes for the safety of neighboring countries. Some left voluntarily; others had been forcibly expelled by the advancing Israeli forces.

Crowded into decrepit refugee camps in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt, the Palestinians dreamed of the day when the Arab armies would arise to destroy Israel and return them to their homes. The Arab states, however, disheartened by the crushing defeat inflicted on them by the inferior Israeli forces, had no desire to launch another war. Inside the refugee camps, groups of desperate and disgruntled Palestinians were slowly banding together and establishing new political movement and associations. Out of these groups emerged new leaders, men who were untainted by the humiliation of the 1948-9 defeat and had not been party to the broken promises of their Arab hosts. These leaders argued that the Palestinian must henceforth rely on no one but themselves if they were ever to reclaim their homeland. Small groups of *fedayeen* (Arabic for "commandos") began to sneak out of the refugee camps to carry out cross-border hit-and-run attacks inside Israel. In fact, it was not until after 1968, when the *fedayeen* took their struggle against Israel outside the Middle East and began deliberately enmeshing citizens from more distant countries in their struggle, that the Palestinians discovered an effectual means of broadcasting their cause to the world and attracting its attention and sympathy. "When we hijack a plane it has more effect than if we killed a hundred Israeli's in a battle." The popular front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) founder and leader, Dr.

George Habash, explained in a 1970 interview.⁶² Some Middle Eastern terrorist groups are guided by Arab nationalism or leftwing ideologies rather than Islamic fundamentalism. Some of the leftwing nationalist groups have reactivated their terrorist and commando operations during the Palestinian uprising, for examples: Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), PFLP, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) and Abu Nidal Organization (ANO).⁶³

Since the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, radical Islam has attracted widespread press attention as the driving ideology of the most active Middle Eastern terrorist groups.

Hizballah. (Party of God).⁶⁴ The Lebanese Hizballah, has been a player in Lebanese and regional politics since 1982. It gained international notoriety as a result of the 1993 suicide attack that claimed the lives of 241 U.S. Marines, then stationed in Lebanon.⁶⁵ Hizballah was also responsible for a series of kidnappings of U.S. and Western hostages during the 1980's, and attacks against Israel and Jewish targets in Argentina during the 1990's. Since its inception, Hizballah has been engaged in a prolonged fight against Israel and its South Lebanon Army (SLA) ally, and took credit for the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 and the dismantling of the SLA. It remains at odds with Israel over its continued occupation of an enclave in the Golan Heights along the Lebanon-Syria border. Hizballah is a strong supporter of the Palestinian cause.⁶⁶

⁶²Bruce Hoffman, 70.

⁶³For a detailed discussion of these organizations, see Gabrielle Perry, *Terrorism Reader* (Huntington, New York 2001), 48-53.

⁶⁴For a detailed discussion of Hizballah, see Sami G. Hajjar, *Hizballah: Terrorism, National Liberation or menace?*, (SSI, August 2002), 1-39.

⁶⁵Sami G. Hajjar, iii.

⁶⁶Ibid.

In his State of the Union Address in January 2002, President George W. Bush specifically mentioned Hizballah as part of a “terrorist underworld” that threatens U.S. interests.⁶⁷

Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Prior to the September 2000 outbreak of the Palestinian uprising, it appeared that the bulk of the leadership of the *Sunni* Muslim Palestinian group Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) was accommodating Yasir Arafat’s leadership of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Hamas leaders also appeared resigned to an eventual final peace agreement between Israel and the PA, although they continued to criticize Arafat as too eager to compromise with Israel. Since the uprising began, Hamas and its smaller ally, PIJ have escalated terrorist attacks against Israel. Hamas and PIJ have not targeted the United States or American’s directly, although American’s have died in attacks by these groups, along with Israeli’s and often the bombers themselves.⁶⁸

The Islamic Group and *Al-Jihad*. The Islamic Group and *Al-Jihad* formed in the early 1970’s as offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood, which opted to work within the political system after being crushed by former President Gamal Abd Al-nasser.⁶⁹ Both seek to replace Egypt’s pro-western, secular government with an Islamic State. *Al-Jihad* was responsible for the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in October 1981. There have been no large-scale terrorist attacks by these groups since the Islamic Group’s November 17, 1997 attack on tourists near Luxor. The gunmen in the Luxor attack killed 58 tourists and wounded 26 others.

⁶⁷ Bush, George W., *The President’s State of the Union Address*, January 29, 2002.

⁶⁸ Gabriele Perry, 35.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 34.

Al-Qaeda (Usama bin Laden Network).⁷⁰ Over the past six years, Al-Qaeda (Arabic for “the base”) the network of Usama bin Laden has evolved from a regional threat to U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf to a global threat to the U.S. citizens and national security interests. In building this network, bin Laden has assembled a coalition of desperate radical Islamic groups of varying nationalities to work toward common goals – expulsion of non-Muslim control or influence from Muslim-inhabited lands. The network’s ideology laid out in several pronouncements signed by bin Laden and his allies, has led bin Laden to support Islamic fighters or terrorists against Serb forces in Bosnia, against Soviet forces in Afghanistan and now Russian forces in Chechnya; against India’s control over part of Kashmir; against secular or pro-western government in Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and against U.S. troops and citizens in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Yemen, Jordan and against the U.S. mainland itself.⁷¹ In 2000 bin Laden announced the formation of the World Islamic Front for the *Jihad* Against Jews and Crusaders, an umbrella group of radical movements across the Muslim world, and issued a *fatwa* (normal Islamic law) stating that it is the duty of all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens and their allies. The title of the organization summed up the man and his view of the world. Muslims were under siege, their lands occupied in a world dominated by their historic enemies, militant Christianity and Judaism.⁷²

***Jihad* (Holy War).** “What is *Jihad*?” One might say that *Jihad* is striving to lead a good Muslim life, praying and fasting regularly, being an attentive spouse and parent.

⁷⁰ Usama bin Laden, born July 30, 1957 as the seventeenth of twenty sons of a (now deceased) Saudi construction magnate of Yemeni origin, gained prominence during the Afghan war against the Soviet Union. Gabrielle Perry, 40.

⁷¹ Ibid, 36.

⁷² Esposito, 21,

Another might identify *Jihad* as working hard to spread the message of Islam. For a third, it might be supporting the struggle of oppressed Muslim peoples in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya or Kosovo. And for Usama bin Laden, *Jihad* could mean working to overthrow government in the Muslim world and attacking America.⁷³

The importance of *Jihad* is rooted in the Quran's, command to struggle (the literal meaning of the word *Jihad*) in the path of God and in the example of the Prophet Muhammad and his early companions. These are fundamentals of Muslim belief and practice, *Jihad* is a concept with multiple meanings, used and abused throughout Islamic history. Although *Jihad* has always been an important part of the Islamic tradition, in recent years some Muslims have maintained that it is a universal religious obligation for all true Muslims to join the *Jihad* to promote a global Islamic revolution. Many Muslims today believe that the restoration of Muslim power and prosperity requires a return to Islam, the creation of more islamically oriented states and societies. Some Muslims a radicalized minority, combine militancy with messianic visions to inspire and mobilize an Army of God whose *Jihad* they believe will liberate Muslims at home and abroad.⁷⁴

If *Jihad* has so many meanings, how are they to be understood? The history of the Muslim community from Muhammad to the present can be read within the framework of what the Quran teaches about *Jihad*. The Quranic teaching have been of essential significance to Muslim self-understanding, mobilization, expansion, and defense. *Jihad* as a struggle pertains to the difficulty and complexity of living a good life. Struggling against the evil in oneself in order to be virtuous and moral, making

⁷³ Ibid, 26.

⁷⁴ Ibid, 27.

a serious effort to do good works and to help to reform society. It also can mean fighting a society of injustice, oppressions, spreading and defending Islam, and creating a just society through preaching, teaching and if necessary, armed struggle or holy war.⁷⁵

Jihad essentially means struggle. It comes from the Arabic verb (*Jahada*): to strive, struggle, fight. Muslim jurists have identified two types of *Jihad* in the religious sense. The Greater *Jihad* (*al-Jihad al-akbar*) refers to the personal struggle of the heart, where the believer strives to overcome personal temptations and the carnal self. This inner struggle is the highest form of *Jihad*. Here Muslims strive to internalize the Islamic message through such prescribed action as prayer, fasting and almsgiving. The lesser *Jihad* (*al-Jihad al-asgher*) is the outward struggle of the Muslim against the enemies of the faith. This struggle requires the use of the tongue, the hands or the sword. It is only with the sword that Muslims actually engage in mortal combat by taking arms against Islam's adversaries. When Prophet Muhammad returned from battle, he told his followers, "We return from the Lesser *Jihad* to the Greater *Jihad*."⁷⁶

Muhammad's prophetic call summoned the people to strive and struggle (*Jihad*) to reform their communities and to live a good life based on religious belief and not loyalty to their tribe.⁷⁷ The Quran rejected Arabian polytheism and insisted that there was only one true God.⁷⁸ It also clearly prohibits forced conversion. "There is no compulsion in religion."⁷⁹ It specifically singles out Christians and Jews as a people of the book (*ahl-al-kitab*), a term that also applies to Muslims.

⁷⁵ Ibid, 28.

⁷⁶ Esposito, 28.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 30.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Quran 2:256.

Islam and the Quran, like all the great world religions and their scriptures, offer a universal message, a discourse that can speak to all times and places.⁸⁰ Believers in every age and situation find teachings, principles, and values that give them meaning and guidance. Jews can look to the Hebrew Bible to find stories of Joshua and King David spreading and defending their faith and community by warfare as well as passages that extol the virtues of peace. Christians look to a tradition that can support pacifism but also a just war theory that legitimates warfare. Similarly, the Quran and the *Sunnah*, or prophetic example, provide a theology for peace, for living in a world of diverse nation and people. They also provide guidelines on how to fight the enemy as well as how to fight against corruption and oppression.

In his *address to a joint session of Congress and the American people* on September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush said, "...I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We respect your faith. It's practiced freely by many millions of Americans, and by millions more in countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying in effect to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends, it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government that support them."⁸¹

⁸⁰ Esposito, 29.

⁸¹ Bush, George W. *Address to a joint session of Congress and the American people*, 20 September 2001.

CHAPTER THREE

COMBATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

In World War II we fought to make the world safer, then worked to rebuild it. As we wage war today to keep the world safe from terror, we must also work to make the world a better place for all its citizens.⁸²

President George W. Bush
Washington, D.C. (Inter-American Development Bank) March 14, 2002.

Collectively, counterterrorism and antiterrorism techniques encompass the larger DOD term called "Combating terrorism." Counterterrorism measures are those offensive measures that combat terrorism. Counterterrorism encompasses measures to prevent, deter and respond to a terrorist incident.⁸³ FBI agents apprehending a terrorist or rescuing hostages are conducting a counterterrorism act. The U.S. campaign against bin Laden and Al Qaeda is an example of a counterterrorism act. In contrast, defensive measures are defined as antiterrorism. Metal and bomb detectors at airports, and improving personnel awareness and knowledge of personnel protection techniques are examples of antiterrorism techniques.⁸⁴

International terrorism has long been recognized as a foreign and domestic security threat. The tragic events of September 11 in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania have dramatically re-energized the nation's focus and resolve on terrorism. The former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has this message on how to defeat international terrorism: "Can we as a country, can the community of free nations, stand in a purely defensive posture and absorb the blows dealt by terrorists? I think not. From a practical standpoint, a purely passive defense does not provide enough of

⁸² Full Text, "Bush National Security Strategy", September 20, 2002.

⁸³ Headquarter Department of the Army and Air Force, *F.M.100-20-Air Force pamphlet 3-20 Military operation in low intensity conflict*. (Washington, D.C. 5, December.1990), 5-11.

⁸⁴ Ibid, 5-12.

a deterrent to terrorism and the states that sponsor it. It is time to think long, hard and seriously about more active means of defense – defense through appropriate preventive or pre-emptive action against terrorist groups before they strike.”⁸⁵

There are no simple solutions to the problem of terrorism, particularly because future incidents could be more costly in terms of human lives and property. Terrorism is by no means a new form of warfare; it has been witnessed in nearly every conflict of ideas, wills and national groups in history.⁸⁶ The war against terrorism is a serious effort to address the important question of how the U.S. can effectively stop the threat of terrorism coming from the Middle East?

Stopping and deterring state support to terrorism should, when possible, be pursued through diplomatic, legal and multilateral channels. One element of this should be strengthening the international, legal proscriptions on support for terrorism. Attempts to do this have been underway for years, but have been hindered by ideological and political considerations.⁸⁷ In recent years, a basic legal framework has begun to take shape. For instance, the 1994 and 1996 Declarations on Measures to eliminate international terrorism of the United Nation (UN) General Assembly condemned all terrorist acts and methods regardless of political, philosophical, ideological, ethnic or religious considerations. This was further strengthened in Resolution 1269 (October 19, 1999) in which the U.N. Security Council: “Unequivocally condemns all acts, methods, and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, in all their forms and manifestations, wherever and by whomever committed, in particular

⁸⁵ Benjamin Netanyahu, *Fighting Terrorism, How Democracies Can Defeat the International Terrorism Network*, (New York, 2001) 69.

⁸⁶ Neil C. Livingstone, *The War Against Terrorism*. (Lexington, Massachusetts, 1982), 2.

⁸⁷ Col. John R. Martin, *Defeating Terrorism: Strategic Issue Analysis*, (U.S. Army War College, January 2002), 22.

those which could threaten international peace and security.”⁸⁸ In his *remarks at the United Nation General Assembly* on September 12, 2002, President Bush said: “My nation will work with the U.N. Security Council to meet our common challenge.”⁸⁹

The present organization for implementing U.S. policy against terrorism got its start when President Nixon established a Cabinet-level Committee chaired by the Secretary of State in 1972.⁹⁰ President Carter transferred the responsibility to the National Security Council (NSC) and established a supporting 10-member, Senior-level Interagency Executive Committee on Terrorism that eventually evolved into a group of more than 30 governmental organizations.⁹¹

President Reagan set the stone for a stronger stand against terrorists soon after taking office when he welcomed home released American hostages from Iran on January 28, 1981. He said: “Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution”.⁹²

President George H.W. Bush continued to take a hard stand against terrorism and the countries that support it. He also held the line against making concessions to terrorists despite urging from many that he try to strike a deal for the release of Americans held hostage in Lebanon until December 1991.⁹³ On May 2, 1995, President Clinton asked congress to approve \$142 million in emergency funding to pay for the investigations into the Oklahoma City bombing and activities to improve security at the White House and other government buildings. He established a domestic terrorism center

⁸⁸ Ibid, 23.

⁸⁹ Bush, George W. *Remarks by the President in Address to the United Nations General Assembly*, New York, New York, 12 Sept 2002 (White House news & speeches. online)
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release/2002/09/20020911-3.htm>. Accessed 18 Dec 02.

⁹⁰ Gabrielle Perry, 6.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid, 7.

⁹³ Ibid.

to be coordinated by the FBI, and set up four permanent "National Response Team" to investigate bombings and bomb threats.⁹⁴

The chain of command on antiterrorism planning runs from the President through the National Security Council (NSC). The State Department is the lead agency for countering terrorism overseas.⁹⁵ It has formed an office for the coordinator for counterterrorism to accomplish this. The CIA is the lead agency for counterterrorist intelligence collection overseas.⁹⁶ The DOD, as a supporting agency, operates through the National Command Authority (the President and the Secretary of Defense).

Intelligence information among the various agencies is coordinated by an intelligence committee, chaired by the CIA, along with representatives from the DOD, NSC, FBI, the Secret Service and the National Security Agency (NSA). There is also a top-level Special Situation Group, headed by the Vice President, which has been established to handle crisis management.⁹⁷ Other members of this group include the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Counselor to the President, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chief and Deputy Chief to the President, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other personnel as required.⁹⁸

The chain of command used in a purely military operation is normally much clearer than those in the interagency operations. In conducting military operations, Unity of Command is an important principal of war. Unity of Command means that all the forces fall under one responsible Commander who has the "requisite authority to direct

⁹⁴ Ibid, 93-94.

⁹⁵ Ibid, 7.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

all forces in pursuit of a unified purpose".⁹⁹ During the Gulf War, General Schwarzkopf, as Commander-In-Chief U.S. Central Command, Commanded all U.S. forces. In the interagency environment of counterterrorism, however, Unity of Command is not always possible. There is no Commander-In-Chief counterterrorism. Despite spending more than any other federal department on combating terrorism, the DOD has only a supporting role. Thus, in an interagency environment, unity of effort, coordination through cooperation and common interests, becomes paramount.¹⁰⁰ Unity of effort requires ways to integrate the action of various responsible agencies of the U.S. and foreign governments. Intelligence is particularly important and sensitive. International cooperation in combating terrorism has advanced to the point at which it is not unusual for a deployed U.S. Army unit to interact with several U.S. government intelligence agencies, which in turn, are interacting with multiple international systems.

U.S. Policy Response

Past Administrations have employed a range of measures to combat international terrorism, from diplomacy and international cooperation and constructive engagement to economic sanctions, covert action, and use of military force.¹⁰¹ The application of sanctions is one of the most frequently used antiterrorism tools of U.S. policymakers. Generally, U.S. antiterrorism policy from the late 1970's to the mid 1990's focused on deterring and punishing state sponsors as opposed to terrorist groups themselves. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, President Bush, in addressing the nation, stressed that the United States in responding to the attacks, will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and

⁹⁹ U.S. Army, *FM 100-5 operations* (Washington: Department of the Army, June 1993), 2-5

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ CRI Issue Brief, IB 95112, July 10, 2002.

those who harbor them. The President characterized the incidents as “acts of war.”¹⁰² Secretary of State, Colin Powell, called for a “full scale assault against terrorism” and announced plans to launch a worldwide coalition against terrorism.¹⁰³ The Bush Administration’s global diplomatic, military and economic assault against Al Qaeda and its affiliates epitomized the new U.S. focus on rooting out and dismantling self-supporting terrorist entities. A U.S. military operation was launched in early October 2001, against the Taliban regime and against Al Qaeda strongholds in Afghanistan. A total of 136 countries offered a range of military assistance to the U.S., including over flight and landing rights accommodations for U.S. forces.¹⁰⁴ In addition to the 7,000 U.S. troops currently in Afghanistan, U.S. forces have been dispatched to Yemen, the Philippines and the former Soviet Republic of Georgia to train local militaries to fight terrorists.¹⁰⁵ In *his National Security Strategy* President George W. Bush said:

Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence. In keeping with our heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage, we seek instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom: Conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty. By making the world safer, we allow the people of the world to make their own lives better. We will defend this just peace against threats from terrorists and tyrants.¹⁰⁶

Policy Tools

President George W. Bush in address Congress and the American people specifically focused on how the U.S. should fight and win this war. “We will direct every resource at our command...every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence and every necessary

¹⁰² Bush, George W. *Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American people on Sept 20, 2001*.

¹⁰³ Gabrielle Perry, 119.

¹⁰⁴ CRS Issue Brief, 1B 95112, July 10, 2002.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Full text: “*Bush’s National Security Strategy*”, September 20, 2002.

weapon of war...to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.”¹⁰⁷

Instruments used by the U.S. government to combat international terrorism are described briefly below.

Diplomacy/Constructive Engagement. Use of diplomacy to help create a global counterterrorism coalition is a central component of the Bush Administration response to September 11th events. To date, the United Nations Security Council has condemned the attack in unanimous declaration, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General, George Robertson, has characterized the attack, in terms of Article V (mutual defense provisions) of the NATO Treaty, as an attack on all members of the NATO alliance.¹⁰⁸ In most cases diplomatic measures are considered least likely to widen the conflict and therefore are usually tried first.

Incidents of international terrorism by sub-national groups, implementing a policy response of constructive engagement is complicated by the lack of existing channels and mutually accepted rules of conduct between governmental entities and the group in question. For instance, as was the case with the PLO, legislation may specifically prohibit official contact with a terrorist organization or it's members. Yet for groups that are well entrenched in a nation's Political fabric and culture, engaging the group might be preferable to trying to exterminate it. Increasingly, governments appear to be pursuing policies, which involve verbal contact and even direct negotiations with terrorist groups or their representatives. Colombia's on-again, off- again peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia is one recent example.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ Bush, George W. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American people", September 20, 2001.

¹⁰⁸ CRS Issue Brief, IB 95112 on July 10, 2002.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

On a different level in the wake of the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration clearly has explored the possibility of enlisting state sponsors of terrorism, such as Libya and Sudan, in a broader Islamic Coalition against Al Qaeda and its followers. The U.S. also has held discussions with Iran concerning formation of a post-Taliban coalition government in Afghanistan.¹¹⁰

Also, according to former Stern gang member Nathan Yalin Mor, "The only way to fight terrorism is to solve the real problems. If you do, the anti-social elements will not be able to exist very long."¹¹¹ Terrorism neither occurs in a vacuum nor is it generally the product of outside agitation or imported ideologies, though such factors may contribute significantly to its growth and development. In this matter President George W. Bush said: "We have finite political, economic and military resources to meet our global priorities. The U.S. will approach each case with these strategic principles in mind: The United States should invest time and resources into building international relationships and institutions that can help manage local crises when they emerge. And the U.S should be realistic about its ability to help those who are unwilling or unready to help themselves. Where and when people are ready to do their part, we will be willing to move decisively."¹¹² In this issue President George W. Bush said:

As the U.S. Government relies on the Armed Forces to defend American's interests, it must rely on diplomacy to interact with other nations. We will ensure that the Department of State receives funding sufficient to ensure the success of American diplomacy. The State Department takes the lead in managing our bilateral relationships with other governments. And in this new era, its people and institutions must be able to interact equally adroitly with non-government organizations and international institutions.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Nile C. Livingstone, 159.

¹¹² Full text: *Bush's National Security Strategy*, September 20, 2002.

¹¹³ Ibid.

Economic Sanctions. In the past, use of economic sanctions was usually predicated upon identification of a nation as an active supporter or sponsor of international terrorism. Sanctions also can be used to target assets of terrorist groups themselves. Sanctioning of regimes can be essentially unilateral – such as U.S. bans on trade and investment relations with Cuba and Iran – or multilateral, such as that mandated in response to the Pan Am 103 bombing.¹¹⁴ The Clinton Administration had frozen the assets of 12 alleged Middle East terrorist organizations and 18 individuals associated with those organizations.¹¹⁵ On September 25, 2001, President George W. Bush signed an executive order (Executive order 13324) freezing the assets of 27 organizations known to be affiliated with bin Laden’s network and giving the Treasury’s Secretary broad powers to impose sanctions on banks around the world that provide these organizations access to the international financial system.¹¹⁶ According to Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, the U.S. coordinator for counterterrorism, “We’ve frozen in excess of \$125 million in assets around the world...funds that have been associated with terrorism and terrorist groups, or organizations that support terrorist groups.”¹¹⁷ In 1990, after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the world imposed economic sanctions on Iraq. Those sanctions were maintained after the war to compel the regime’s compliance with Security Council resolutions.¹¹⁸ On September 28, 2001 the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1373 which requires all states to “Limit the ability of terrorists and terrorist organizations to operate internationally” by freezing their assets and denying them safe-haven.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁴ CRS Issue Brief, IB95112, July 10, 2002.

¹¹⁵ Gabrielle Perry, 122.

¹¹⁶ CRS, Issue Brief, IB 95112, July 10, 2002.

¹¹⁷ U.S. Department of State, *International Information Program*, available from: <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/02090901.htm> on September 09, 2002.

¹¹⁸ Bush, George W., *President remarks at the United Nation General Assembly*, September 12, 2002.

¹¹⁹ Gabrielle Perry, 123.

The effects of the above-described economic measures are uncertain because much of the flow of terrorist funds takes place outside of formal banking channels (in elusive “*hawala*” chains of money brokers). Furthermore, most of Al Qaeda money is believed to be held not in banks but in untraceable assets such as gold and diamonds. Also, some observers have noted that lethal terrorist operations are relatively inexpensive.¹²⁰ Estimates of the cost of the terrorists actions to the World Trade Center – Pentagon bombings range from \$200,000 to \$500,000.¹²¹

Economic sanctions fall into six categories: Restrictions on trading, technology transfer, foreign assistance, export credits and guarantees, foreign exchange and capital transactions, and economic access.¹²² Sanctions may include a total or partial trade embargo, embargo on financial transactions, suspension of foreign aid, restrictions on aircraft or ship traffic, or abrogation of a friendship, commerce and navigation treaty. Sanctions usually require the cooperation of other countries to make them effective and such cooperation is not always forthcoming.

Intelligence Capability. Timely and reliable intelligence forms the first line of defense against terrorism. Since terrorists may chose the time and place of their attacks from an almost infinite number of possibilities, authorities are at considerable disadvantage in thwarting terrorist violence since they cannot be everywhere at once in equal strength. A well-developed intelligence capability not only may provide authorities with advance information about a forthcoming terrorist operation, permitting them to take steps to avert the incident or at least to minimize the damage, but also aids them in tracking down suspected terrorists and bringing them to justice.

¹²⁰ CRS Issue Brief, IB95112, July 10, 2002.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

Activities that can be undertaken by intelligence organizations include the surveillance of suspected terrorists and terrorist groups; the infiltration of terrorist movements; the development of informer networks; the design and implementation of contingency systems to respond to terrorist threats; the collection, storage and analysis of information; and direct counter-terrorist warfare. The computer known as the Octopus at the Langley, Virginia headquarters of the CIA forms the backbone of the U.S. effort against international terrorism; data from every terrorist movement in the world is fed into the Octopus; along with information detailing the movement and activities of known or suspected terrorists.¹²³ By assembling and digesting a myriad of bits and pieces of information, experts ultimately seek to predict terrorist behavior.

In his National Security Strategy on September 20, 2002, President Bush said, "Intelligence...is our first line of defense against terrorists and the threat posed by hostile states. Intelligence must be appropriately integrated with our defense and law enforcement systems and coordinated with our allies and friends."¹²⁴

International cooperation in such areas as law enforcement and intelligence activities is an essential pillar of the Bush Administration counterterrorism policy and response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on America. This Administrations National Security Strategy document states, "We have a responsibility to share intelligence and coordinate the efforts of law enforcement. If you know something, tell us. If we know something we'll tell you. And when we find the terrorists, we must work together to bring them to justice."¹²⁵

¹²³ Neil C. Livingstone, 161.

¹²⁴ Full text: "*Bush's National Security Strategy*", September 20, 2002.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

International Coalition. In his National Security Strategy President Bush said:

“The United States and countries cooperating with us must not allow the terrorists to develop new home basis. Together, we will seek to deny them sanctuary at every turn.”¹²⁶ The United States cannot defeat global terrorism without support from its friends and allies.¹²⁷ The September 11 terrorist attack on the U.S. outraged Europeans, but not in the same manner as it did Americans. Although, currently united in principle with the U.S. to defeat the Al Qaeda terrorist network, political will and consensus are likely to wane as Operation ENDURING FREEDOM continues. This paradox is best explained by seeing how Europeans view terrorism.

Of all the instruments of power to be employed in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, a prominent military option is likely to be the most contentious with Europeans. The arguments against the use of military force would expound the following themes: Terrorism does not threaten the survival of the state – the military is the wrong instrument of power; Operation ENDURING FREEDOM appears to be an open-ended obligation – fear of military adventurism, a military conflict with result in collateral damage - alienation of indigenous populations and added impetus to the terrorist movements, the conflict could easily escalate into a full-fledged war, a long-term war would have severe economic consequences, and because of its geographic proximity to the Middle East and Magreb, Europe is particularly vulnerable to terrorist retaliation from the Muslim community.¹²⁸

The conflict will not have a negative impact on NATO enlargement. The campaign against global terrorism has had a unifying effect and is likely to accelerate the

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Col John R. Martin (SSI), 101.

¹²⁸ Ibid, 102.

desire to increase membership among NATO members and candidates. In times of regional instability, states seek greater security.¹²⁹ European Special Operating Force (SOF) appear to be the most proper and readily available for employment. Only the United Kingdom (UK) has deployed its Special Air Service (SAS) into Afghanistan along with U.S. forces. Germany is hotly debating whether to authorize the deployment of its division for special operation composed of Special Forces detachment and two airborne brigades. France also has a robust SOF capability and unlike Germany has plenty of experience. Additionally, several other European countries have SOF, although not large.¹³⁰

European countries have considerable access to and influence with their former colonies. In fact their relation are more cooperative than adversarial. The U.S. should allow these European countries to supplement its effort with regional consensus building, intelligence gathering and diplomacy. In his *National Security Strategy* President George W. Bush, develop agenda for cooperative action with the other main centers of Global

Powers:

America will implement its strategies by organizing coalitions...The attacks of September 11 were also an attack on NATO...Australia invoked the ANZUS Treaty to declare the September 11 was an attack on Australia itself...Japan and the Republic of Korea provided unprecedented levels of military logistical support within weeks of the terrorist attack...We have deepened cooperation on counter-terrorism with our alliance partners in Thailand and the Philippines and received invaluable assistance from close friends like Singapore and New Zealand. With Russia...we are broadening our already extensive cooperation in the global war on terrorism...With India...we share an interest in fighting terrorism and in creating a strategically stable Asia. With China...we already cooperate well where our interests overlap, including the current war on terrorism and in promoting stability on the Korean peninsula.¹³¹

Declaring war on terrorism, not on Islam, was one of the most critical U.S.

¹²⁹ Ibid, 103.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Full text: "*Bush's National Security Strategy*", September 20, 2002.

statements. It leaves no doubt, at least in national rhetoric, that America's enemies are those who pervert Islam with unacceptable violence. Building an international coalition with partners from the Arab and Islamic worlds is also an important key. They give great credibility to the U.S. led efforts. Just as was the case in the Gulf war, when Arab allies demonstrated that aggression by an Arab and Muslim country would not be tolerated. Jordan has deployed SOF into Afghanistan along with U.S. Forces. Additionally, Turkey has deployed a number of Turkish soldiers, which provides visible evidence of Muslim support on the ground for the war against terrorism. Middle East government, particularly Egypt, have stated that their primary difficulty in supporting the war on terrorism more aggressively is American's support for Israel, which they perceive to be at the expense of the Palestinians.¹³²

Use of Military Forces. In his *State of the Union Address* on January 29, 2002, President George W. Bush specifically mentioned U.S. armed forces, "When I called our troops into action, I did so with complete confidence in their courage and skill. The men and women of our armed forces have delivered a message now clear to every enemy of the United States".¹³³

The recent terrorist attacks on New York and Washington have focused the attention of the nation and its military on immediately combating this serious threat. The military action – with the immediate task of defeating bin Laden and his training bases in Afghanistan – is only the first part of a complex campaign. President Bush and his Cabinet have been clear that this will be a long struggle. The Army must not neglect its many other important shaping and preparing missions during that time.

¹³² Col John R. Martin (SSI) 56.

¹³³ Bush, George W., "*President Delivers State of the Union Address*", January 29, 2002.

U.S. needs and interests require a broad and balanced security focus. While the Army will understandably place high priority on contributing to the war against terrorism, the service must simultaneously conduct operations along four other axes. It must continue its involvement in day-to-day engagement activities around the world, sustain its capability to conduct peace operations, remain ready to fight and deter major wars, and maintain momentum for transformation.¹³⁴ The Army was already stretched by its operational tempo before September 11; the new demand will only exacerbate that situation.

Although not without difficulty, military forces, particularly when wielded by a superpower such as the U.S., can carry substantial clout. Proponents of selective use of military forces usually emphasize the military's unique skills and specialized equipment. The April 1986 decision to bomb Libya for its alleged role in the bombing of a German discotheque exemplifies the use of military forces. Other examples include: First, the 1993 bombing of Iraq's military intelligence headquarters by U.S. forces in response to the Iraqi effort to assassinate former President Bush during a visit to Kuwait. Second, the August 1998 missile attacks against bases in Afghanistan and an alleged chemical production facility in Sudan.¹³⁵ Third, the successful removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001-2002, and finally U.S. military operations to help fight terrorists in the Philippines, Yemen and Georgia.¹³⁶

Successful use of military forces for pre-emptive or retaliatory strikes presupposes the ability to identify a terrorist perpetrator or its state sponsor, as well as the precise location of the group, information that is often unavailable from U.S. intelligence

¹³⁴ Col John R. Martin, (SSI), 27.

¹³⁵ Gabrielle Perry, 126.

¹³⁶ CRS Issue Brief, IB 95112, on July 10, 2002.

sources.¹³⁷ Generally, terrorists possess modest physical facilities that present few high-value targets for military strikes. Some critics have observed that military action is a blunt instrument that can cause foreign civilian casualties as well as collateral damage to economic installations in the target country. Others argue that such action inflates terrorists' sense of importance and facilitates their recruitment efforts. A 1999 U.S. study of the sociology and psychology of terrorism states that, "counterterrorism military attacks against elusive terrorists may serve only to radicalize large sectors of the Muslim population and damage the U.S. image worldwide."¹³⁸ Risks associated with the use of military forces include counter-reaction and escalation by terrorist groups or their state sponsors, failure to destroy the principal leaders of the organization, and the perception that the U.S. ignores rules of international law. In addition, the costs associated with Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, according to President Bush "it costs a lot to fight this war. We have spent more than a billion dollars a month...over \$30 million a day."¹³⁹

Today U.S. policy focus is on terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda, affiliated networks and state supporters. But, in the future it may be the new brands of terrorists that emerge: Individuals who are not affiliated with any established terrorist organization and who are apparently not agents of any state sponsor. The terrorists who masterminded the 1993 World Trade Center bombing apparently did not belong to any larger, established and previously identified group.¹⁴⁰ Another problem surfacing in the wake of the number of incidents associated with Islamic fundamentalist groups is how to condemn and combat such terrorist activity, and the extreme and violent ideology of specific radical groups, without appearing to be anti-Islamic in general. A desire to

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Bush, George W., "President Delivers State of the Union Address", on January 29, 2002.

¹⁴⁰ CRS Issue Brief IB 95112, July 10, 2002.

punish a state for supporting international terrorism may also conflict with other foreign policy objectives involving that nation.

CONCLUSION

This monograph examined the origin, structure, goals of the international terrorism, and terrorist action and identified steps the U.S. can take to stop the threat of terrorism coming from the Middle East. Five out of the seven states currently on the terrorist list are located in the Middle East – Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Sudan. All these states are covered in this monograph. It is this author's perspective that a U.S. strategy premised on the simplistic assumption that there is no difference between a good terrorist and a bad terrorist, and no distinction should be made between terrorist organizations is highly risky. Using the analogy of a disease, the object is to correct the abnormality – not to destroy the disease by destroying the patient.

In today's world, a terrorist movement can be built and operated without state support. Terrorists can fund themselves via crime or even legitimate business ventures and charities. They can obtain information and intelligence via open sources. They can communicate and coordinate their activities using the global information infrastructure, protected by various forms of encryption. And, they can train almost anywhere by simply renting an isolated house or farm. Still, state support certainly makes terrorism easier and more effective. Eliminating it is an important but complex part of the war on terrorism.

The continued rogue status of Iraq is equally worrisome, Saddam Hussein shows no signs of retreating from his desire to develop WMD, but he appears to be winning the propaganda war. Broad sanctions against Iraq are unenforceable, and continued allied efforts to contain his activities are losing International support. After Al Qaeda merged

with Egyptian Islamic *Jihad* in the late 1990's, The Islamic World feels sympathy for the Palestinian People, and many Muslims regard suicide bombing as the most effective weapons left to the Palestinians in their armed struggle against Israeli occupation. And, in his propaganda war since, bin Laden has identified four major reasons for fighting the U.S.: Muslims were under siege; the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia with the two holiest cities of Mecca and Madina; U.S. support for Israel in its oppression of Palestinian people and occupation of Jerusalem; and the suffering of the Iraqi people as a result of Washington's campaign against Saddam Hussein's regime.

Washington must be careful in waging war against terrorism so as not to incite more support for bin Laden. Two fronts are important for deflating the passions of Muslim people and government around the globe, and initially the Bush Administration has moved wisely on each front. First, there is the propaganda war. Washington has expended some effort into avoiding making the war into a west versus Islam struggle.

This requires some appreciation and admiration for the Islamic religion. Aid to Afghan people and supporting opponents of the Taliban regime are both wise steps. Second, there is the linkage between terrorist networks and the Palestinian Israeli conflict. The administration began addressing this problem when President Bush declared U.S. support for the creation of a Palestinian state, conditional upon the acceptance of Israel's right for existence. Lack of progress in the Palestinian Israeli conflict, coupled with a continuing U.S. campaign against terrorist organizations in the Middle East, will inflame Muslim opinion and further threaten regional stability. Washington should move on this front as part of its overall strategy of defeating terrorism based in the Middle East.

In fact, the war against terrorism can be won, not merely contained. But, this will require war aims focused on terrorist "ideology," not their tactics. The center of gravity in this war lies in the hearts and minds of politically uncommitted groups. The purpose behind identifying the center of gravity is to focus one's efforts on what gives one power. A terrorist is a type of *means*, that is a resource, like a soldier, to implement the *ways* to achieve the *ends*. The *means* of being a terrorist gives those who commit terrorism their power. A terrorist is usually not a visible combatant. They are able to move around and operate in a free society, oblivious to those around them, and conduct their terrible acts. Terrorists thus protect their identity, their center of gravity, by remaining unknown. This is directly related to a United States vulnerability, its free and open society. The *ends* for a terrorist is to intimidate or coerce an audience through the threat or use of violence, their *ways*, by *means* of explosives, hijacking, WMD and other tools. They can accomplish their *ends* by attacking the United States center of gravity. A center of gravity of the U.S., which terrorists could attack, is its free and open society.¹⁴¹

The main elements of a comprehensive U.S. policy for dealing with international terrorism are as follows:

Every effort must be made to restore the prestige and professionalism of U.S. intelligence agencies, which form the first line of defense against terrorism. Combating terrorism is a complex interdisciplinary task involving many agencies with differing federal roles, responsibilities, missions and priorities. The problem is there is no one definition of terrorism to use when coordinating interagency combating terrorism policy.

¹⁴¹ *The Declaration of Independence of the Thirteen Colonies* in Congress, July 4, 1776, available from <http://www.law.indiana.edu/uslawdocs/declaration.html> accessed on January 27, 2003.

The State Department, FBI, CIA and DOD all use definitions with subtle, yet far-reaching differences.

State-sponsored terrorism, nations that train, harbor or support terrorists should be isolated diplomatically, economically and in terms of their communication links with the U.S. A major diplomatic and propaganda offensive should be launched in the UN and other world forums against nations that support international terrorism.

The U.S. should come to the aid of friendly governments that are confronted with endemic terrorism not only by lending public support to their struggle but also by providing them with intelligence, hardware, training, economic assistance and even military advisors. (Jordan and Israel are such an example.)

The U.S. will have to breath new life into its relationship with the UN if that organization is to play a strong and helpful role in the fight against terrorism, as well as in the reconstruction and stabilization of a failed state. The U.S. will have to give that organization full moral and financial support.

The war on terrorism will undoubtedly fail if it is perceived as a war on Islam and generates a call for Muslim solidarity in a holy war against the U.S. and the other powers combating terrorism. No matter how widespread American operations against terrorism are, attacks on numerous targets in Muslim countries will foster the perspective that the U.S. is engaged in a war against Islam. To avoid sending the wrong message to Muslim States the following suggestion is important. First, declaring war on terrorism, not on Islam, was one of the most critical U.S statements. Second, building an International coalition with partners from the Arab and Islamic world is an important key. And finally, expanding the war to include non-Islamic groups out side the Middle East.

Every actor in the Middle East believes that the Israeli Palestinian conflict must be resolved before progress against terrorism can be made. This is one of the several specific flashpoints in the world call for U.S. diplomatic engagement and possibly greater policy flexibility, perhaps in concert with other significant power.

The U.S. should give priority to the Syria-Israel track in the peace process. A settlement between Syria and Israel will lead to a simultaneous peace between Israel and Lebanon. Syria would no longer have any cause to use the "Lebanon and Hizballah Cards" against Israel, and Hizballah would lose its ability to operate militarily against Israel without Syria's assistance.

The U.S. should encourage Israel to vacate the *Shab'a farm* (Southern Lebanon). This strip of land has limited tactical and strategic value to Israel. And, more important, ceding the *Shap'a* enclave to Lebanese sovereignty would deny Hizballah it's principal justification to be involved in guerrilla war operations against Israel.

Sudan and Libya are apparently out of the terrorism business and thus should remove them from the terrorism list because there is no evidence of Libyan or Sudanese involvement in recent acts of international terrorism. Libya has been "sending signals" that it wants to get out of the terrorism business and has offered to compensate the victim's families of the bombing of Pan Am flight 103. Sudan has arrested Al Qaeda members and "by and large" shut down Al Qaeda training camps on its territory. Both Libya and Sudan have offered to share intelligence information on Al Qaeda's activities with U.S. authorities.

It is important to note that military action should not be any nation's automatic response to a terrorist incident. As long as the possibility exists that terrorism may be

prevented or perpetrators brought to justice by means of law enforcement activity, economic sanction or other legal means, these options should be examined and employed to the fullest reasonable extent. However, in those instances where terrorist groups or facilitating nations do not respond to these efforts, the military option must be considered. Military forces and the government interagency perceived or actual, is a viable tool in the war against terrorism and should be viewed as such.

The U.S. should not engage Hizballah and Hamas militarily. If there was a military solution to Hizballah and Hamas, then Israel, experienced in dealing with them and knowledgeable about their area of operations, would have exercised them. Furthermore, U.S. military intervention would be opposed by a majority of the Lebanese and Palestinian people, convinced that Hizballah and Hamas are struggling to liberate occupied Palestinian and Lebanese lands.

The U.S. cannot defeat global terrorism without support from its friends and allies. Europe plays center stage in the counterterrorism campaign. Building an international coalition with partners from the Arab and Islamic world is also key. This gives great credibility to the U.S. led efforts, just as was the case in the Gulf war. To have as many Muslim states as possible in the coalition on the war against terrorism is essential. It is thus important that there be no unnecessary enlargement of the states in the Muslim world that are considered targets.

Finally, the struggle against terrorism is never ending similarly. Our search for a solution and new approaches must be continuous and unyielding. Identical to the threat posed by our adversaries in both innovation and determination. Unlike World War II or

Operation DESERT STORM, this war will not end at an appointed hour by the signing of a peace agreement or the declaration of a ceasefire.

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